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Balancing Prudential Regulation and Shareholder Rights
BANK RESOLUTION REGIMES: BALANCING PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
KERN ALEXANDER*
A bank resolution regime requires regulators to have the authority and instruments to restructure
a bank’s operations if its failure threatens the stability of the financial system or undermines
other regulatory objectives, such as depositor confidence. Such regulatory action, however, may
affect shareholder rights in the restructured bank and possibly reduce the economic value of their
ownership interests. The credit crisis of 2007–09 has demonstrated the importance of having a
resolution regime that balances the rights of shareholders against the objectives of prudential
regulation and crisis management. The constraints of corporate insolvency regimes can be too
cumbersome for effective resolution of a banking enterprise, especially during a financial crisis
when a failing bank not yet insolvent needs to maintain open lines of credit with other financial
institutions and to manage its balance sheet while achieving regulatory objectives. Bank
resolution regimes must be designed not only to protect shareholders and creditors, but also to
achieve other regulatory objectives that are vital for the efficient operation of the economy.
Although the UK Banking Act 2009 provides a comprehensive framework for bank corporate
restructuring and insolvency, it creates a mechanism to suspend corporate governance rules
pre-insolvency and thus interferes with shareholder rights. This raises important issues under
EU company law and the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the protection of
property interests in a restructured bank. The article examines the special resolution regime of
the UK Banking Act 2009, analyses the relevant issues of EU Company Law and related
human rights law and suggests some legal principles to be applied in developing a special
resolution regime.
A. INTRODUCTION
The credit crisis of 2007–09 has demonstrated the importance of bank special
resolution regimes and the need to balance the competing interests of
shareholder rights with the regulatory objectives of financial stability and
depositor protection. The constraints of corporate insolvency regimes can be too
cumbersome for effective resolution of a banking enterprise, especially during a
financial crisis when a failing bank needs to maintain open lines of credit with
other financial institutions and to manage its balance sheet while achieving
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regulatory objectives. Bank resolution regimes must be designed not only to
protect shareholders and creditors, but also to achieve other regulatory objectives
that are vital for the efficient operation of the economy. The UK Banking Act
2009 contains a special resolution regime that seeks to achieve these objectives by
striking a balance between the legitimate rights of bank shareholders and
depositors while promoting financial stability objectives. The Act grants the
Treasury and the Bank of England sweeping powers to restructure a failing bank
and to transfer its shares and property to a government-owned bridge bank or to
a private purchaser. Although the stabilisation regime provides a comprehensive
framework for bank corporate restructuring and insolvency, it authorises the
Bank of England to suspend corporate governance rules pre-insolvency and thus
interferes with shareholder rights. This raises important issues under EU
company law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
regarding the protection of property rights in a bank that is undergoing
restructuring to achieve regulatory objectives.
European corporate law makes it difficult for a regulator to act quickly in
saving or restructuring a failing bank because shareholder approval is required if
the regulator adopts measures that require a change of the bank’s capital
structure.1 This article raises a number of legal and regulatory issues regarding
the application of regulatory powers to a failing bank outside insolvency and its
impact on shareholder rights under European and US law. The article examines
European Community case law regarding the application of regulatory powers
to shareholders’ rights in banks that are organised as public limited liability
companies. Related cases involving the application of the ECHR to shareholder
rights in banking corporations and the scope of prudential regulatory power will
be discussed as well. The cases and issues discussed have become particularly
relevant because the credit crisis of 2007–09 has resulted in substantial erosion
of bank balance sheets and led to regulatory calls for banks to raise additional
capital from both existing shareholders and outside investors (including the
state). The need for many banks to raise additional capital has tested the
effectiveness of the laws and regulations governing the capital structure of banks.
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1 C–441/93 In re Panagis Pafitis and Others, on the interpretation of Art 25 et seq and Art 29 of the
Second Council Directive, Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art 48 of the Treaty,
in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and
alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent ([1977] OJ L26, 1). In
Pafitis, the European Court of Justice ruled, inter alia, that Art 25 of the Directive (77/91/EEC),
requiring that an increase in capital of a public limited liability company be approved by a general
meeting of shareholders, precluded national legislation under which a temporary administrator
outside insolvency could order in exceptional circumstances a bank organised as a public limited
liability company to increase its regulatory capital to protect depositors without approval of a
general meeting of shareholders.
The crisis has led to radical proposals for regulatory reform in Europe and the
US. For instance, the UK Banking Act 2009 has attracted much attention
because it creates a separate resolution regime for UK banks and grants
substantial stabilisation powers to the Bank of England2 to take measures against
a failing bank that may include raising outside capital, transferring shares and
property, as well as contractual rights and liabilities of the bank to another bank
or private purchaser, or merging the bank with a state-owned bridge bank or
private bank. These sweeping regulatory powers raise important issues regarding
the legitimate reach of regulatory power and the scope of shareholder rights
under European law. The article will examine some of the main issues in this
area and the new special resolution regime under the UK Banking Act 2009.
B. BANKING AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The role of banks is integral to any economy. They provide financing for
commercial enterprises, access to payment systems and a variety of retail
financial services for the economy at large.3 Some large banks have a broader
impact on the macroeconomy by facilitating the transmission of monetary policy
and making credit and liquidity available in difficult market conditions.4 The
integral role that banks play in the national economy is demonstrated by the
almost universal practice of states in regulating the banking industry and
providing, in many cases, a government safety net that compensates depositors
when banks fail and offers lender of last resort facilities for banks having
difficulty in accessing credit and liquidity.5
The main rationale of prudential bank regulation has traditionally been the
safety and soundness of the financial sector and protection of depositors.6 A safe
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2 The Banking Act 2009 amends certain provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
and the Banking Act 1998 to establish a Financial Services Compensation Scheme for UK bank
depositors, and a special resolution regime for both solvent but failing banks and insolvent banks
which would be subject to a special administration or special liquidation procedure.
3 F Allen and D Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000), ch 1.
4 See J Hawkins and P Turner, “Managing Foreign Debt and Liquidity Risks in Emerging
Economies: an Overview” [September 2000] BIS Policy Papers 8 http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy08
(last accessed 15 Jan 2009). See M Dewatripont and J Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995), 17–18.
5 See J Stiglitz, “Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach” (Spring 2001)
16 World Bank Research Observer 1, 1–2.
6 Dewatripont and Tirole, supra n 4, 25–32. Bank regulation has traditionally sought to mitigate
these social costs by adopting various prudential measures to promote safety and soundness,
including deposit insurance, capital adequacy requirements, asset composition rules, and fit and
proper standards for bank officers, senior management and board members. See the discussion in
TL Holzman, “Unsafe or Unsound Practices: is the Current Judicial Interpretation of the Term
Unsafe or Unsound?!” (2000) 19 Annual Review of Banking Law 425. For a legal definition of “safety
and soundness” under US law which does not include systemic risk, see First National Bank of
Bellaire v Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F 2d 674, 681 (5th Cir, 1983) (defining unsafe and unsound
and sound banking system requires the effective control of systemic risk.7
Systemic risk arises because banks have an incentive to underprice financial risk
as they do not incur the full social costs of their risk-taking.8 The social costs of
bank risk-taking can arise from the solvency risks posed by banks because of
imprudent lending and trading activity, or from the risks posed to depositors
because of inadequate deposit insurance that can induce a bank run.9 Systemic
risk can also arise from problems with payment and settlement systems, or from
some types of financial failure that induce a macroeconomic crisis.10 Prudential
regulation therefore aims to reduce the social costs which bank risk-taking creates
by adopting controls and incentives that induce banks to price financial risk
more efficiently.11
The social cost of bank risk-taking and the resultant systemic risk make it
necessary for banks to have robust corporate governance arrangements that
incentivise bank management and owners to understand the risks they are taking
and to price it efficiently so as to cover the private costs it may impose on the
bank’s shareholders and the social costs on the broader economy if the bank
fails.12 Corporate governance plays an important role in achieving this in two
ways: by aligning the incentives of bank owners and managers so that managers
seek wealth maximisation for owners, while not jeopardising the bank’s franchise
value through excessive risk-taking; and by incentivising bank management to
price financial risk in a way that covers its social costs. The latter objective is
what distinguishes bank corporate governance from other areas of corporate
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banking practices as “encompass[ing] what may be generally viewed as conduct deemed contrary
to accepted standards of banking operations which might result in abnormal risk or loss to a
banking institution or shareholder”).
7 J Dow, “What is Systemic Risk? Moral Hazard, Initial Shocks, and Propagation” (2000) 18
Monetary and Economic Studies 1, 21. See EP Davis, Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk (Oxford
University Press, 1995), ch 5. See also Stiglitz, supra n 5, 7–8.
8 The social cost of bank risk-taking can take the form of a general loss of confidence by depositors
in the banking sector (bank run) which will force banks to sell off their assets at prices far below
their historic costs. Also, a defaulting bank’s uninsured liabilities to other banks or financial
institutions can serve as a source of contagion that can create substantial losses for other banks
whose unfunded exposures to counterparties derive from the original defaulting bank. Bank
risk-taking therefore creates a negative externality for the broader economy that provides the
major rationale for banking regulation. See FS Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking and
Financial Markets (Harlow, Pearson, Addison-Wesley, 7th edn, 2004), 271–74.
9 Under-priced financial assets can result in imprudent lending and trading activity for banks and
lead to increased solvency risks. See Dewatripont and Tirole, supra n 4, 23–25. Moreover, the
difference between the private costs and the social costs of bank risk-taking is the negative
externality imposed on society via depositors, borrowers and other banks. J Eatwell and L Taylor,
Global Finance at Risk (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000).
10 See Dewatripont and Tirole, supra n 4, 23–24.
11 Stiglitz, supra n 5, 3–5.
12 H Mehran, “Critical Themes in Corporate Governance” (2003) 9 FRBNY Economic Policy Review;
see also J Macey and M O’Hara, “The Corporate Governance of Banks” (2003) 9 FRBNY
Economic Policy Review 91; R Adams and H Mehran, “Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank
Holding Companies?” (2003) 9 FRBNY Economic Policy Review 123.
governance because of the potential social costs that banking can have on the
broader economy.13
The social costs that banks pose for the economy also demonstrate the need
for a special resolution regime for banks that provides a legal framework for the
regulator to decide whether to attempt to save a bank by recapitalisation or other
restructuring pre-insolvency and, if this fails, to oversee the unwinding of the
bank’s multiple positions in insolvency and to sell off its viable assets to other
banks or investors.14 For many countries, including the UK,15 ordinary
insolvency law procedures have applied to the administration and liquidation of
a failing bank. Generally, corporate insolvency law applies an elaborate
framework to rank the economic claims of creditors and other stakeholders
against a firm which is unable or unwilling to honour its financial obligations.
Insolvency law may prove socially costly, however, for certain firms, such as
banks, because insolvency procedures may result in restrictions on a bank
performing its essential function as a financial intermediary in the economy. For
instance, insolvency law may result in a stay on payments and a balance sheet
freeze, which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the bank to rely on
the wholesale funding markets and to manage its counterparty exposures
through netting. The inadequacies of general insolvency law to address the risks
which banks pose to the broader economy has led many countries to enact
special bank resolution regimes. An important element of these resolution
regimes is that they permit the regulator to take certain measures pre-insolvency
which may alter or reduce shareholder rights and the claims of third parties in
order to protect depositors in the weakened bank and to maintain overall
financial stability. The rationale for pre-insolvency intervention is that the
regulator should have the authority to take certain measures in response to a
rapid loss of market confidence which may result in the bank losing access to the
short-term inter-bank loan market and wholesale capital markets which may
result in increased systemic risk in the banking system. Through regulatory
intervention, a market-based solution may become possible. If a market solution
is not possible, however, the intervention may be the first step by the regulator or
central bank taking control of the failing bank and transferring its shares and
other property, including contractual rights and obligations, to a state-owned
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13 Moreover, it should be noted that regulatory intervention is necessary to address the social costs of
bank risk-taking because the regulator is uniquely situated to assert the varied interests of other
stakeholders in society and to balance those interests according to the public interest.
14 See Consultation Document of the Bank of England, HM Treasury and the Financial Services
Authority (FSA), “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Special Resolution Regime” (July
2008). See UK Banking Bill 2009, discussed below.
15 See Consultation Document of the Bank of England, HM Treasury and the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Strengthening the Framework”
(January 2008), 2–4.
bridge bank or a private purchaser. Further steps may involve the bank being
declared insolvent and being subject to administration or liquidation.
For special resolution regimes to work effectively, however, it is necessary that
the regulator has the authority to act quickly and in certain circumstances to set
aside the normal corporate governance rules that usually involve obtaining
shareholder approval if the bank is required to take a course of action that may
diminish shareholder control rights or their economic rights. In other words, the
regulator’s exercise of resolution powers pre-insolvency may have the effect of
compromising shareholder control rights and any regulatory decision to inject
state capital into the bank or to require the bank to raise additional capital from
external sources, or to transfer the bank’s property to another investor without
shareholder assent, could significantly reduce the shareholders’ economic rights.
This should be contrasted with what might happen if the regulator does not
intervene and the bank is declared insolvent. In this scenario, a conservator or
administrator  could  be  appointed  to  manage  the  bank’s  assets  and  business
operations or, alternatively, a receiver or trustee could be appointed to liquidate
the bank’s operations.16 Essentially, insolvency would mean that shareholder
control and governance rights would terminate and the shareholder would be
left with only a residual monetary claim against the assets of the bank’s estate.17
The exercise of regulatory powers in a special resolution regime raises a number
of important legal and regulatory issues regarding how to balance prudential
regulatory objectives and shareholder rights. To examine this, it is necessary to
analyse the substance and scope of shareholder rights under the ECHR and
European Community law.
C. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
In defining shareholder rights, international law has generally made a distinction
between the rights and interests of shareholders. In the Barcelona Traction case, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that a public company with limited
liability is founded on the distinction between the rights of the company and
those of the shareholders.18 Although a wrong committed against a company
may infringe the shareholders’ economic interests, it may not infringe their
rights. The ICJ ruled that whenever a shareholder’s interest is harmed by a
measure directed at the company, it is the company’s legal right, not the
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16 See GN Olson “Government Intervention: The Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency
Resolution—Lessons from the American Experience” in RM Lastra and HN Schiffman (eds),
Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition (The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 1999), 114, 134–36.
17 See E Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the United
States and Canada (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), 54.
18 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, ICJ Reports (1970) paras 56–58.
shareholder, to take appropriate action.19 In other words, an act that only
infringes the company’s rights, and not those of the shareholders, does not
involve legal responsibility towards the shareholders, even though the
shareholders’ economic interests may be harmed. Under international law, the
state (or states) of the shareholders’ nationality has standing to seek redress on
behalf of the shareholders against a foreign state if that state has committed an
act that is directed at, or infringes, shareholder rights or if the company is wound
up.20
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court) has
also addressed the nature of shareholder rights. In Olczak v Poland, the court
recognised that a share was “a complex object” and that a shareholder in a
company had corresponding rights which encompassed “a share in the
company’s assets in the event of its being wound up, and other unconditioned
rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company’s
conduct”.21 In Olczak, the court observed that shares in a public company have
economic value and therefore can be regarded as “possessions” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.22 The share is not only an
indirect claim on company assets, but can include other rights as well, especially
voting rights and the right to influence the company.23
In most European jurisdictions, shareholder rights can be divided into (i)
economic or pecuniary rights, and (ii) control or governance rights. Economic
rights can include the right to receive the remaining value of a company after it
is liquidated or wound up in insolvency. Control rights can include the right to
influence the company’s decision-making and strategic direction.24 More
specifically, shareholder rights usually cover the right to vote at general and
special meetings to elect directors,25 to approve the sale of certain company
April 2009 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 67
19 Ibid, para 58. In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ held that only the state of the company’s nationality,
and not the state of the shareholders’ nationality, could bring a claim on behalf of the company
against a foreign state for an alleged breach of international legal rights involving a breach of legal
duty to a company. The principle is stated under domestic English law as the rule in Foss v
Harbottle. (1843) 2 Hare 461. See also Bamford v Bamford, [1980] Ch 212.
20 Ibid, para 66. In contrast, a shareholder’s economic interests in a company were related to the
company’s future prospects and thus were not legally cognisible interests.
21 Olczak v Poland, ECtHR (7 November 2002) (final decision as to admissibility), 12 (citing ECHR
[decision] App No 11189/84, S and T v Sweden (11 December 1986), DR 50, 158).
22 Ibid.
23 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, ECtHR, No 48553/99 (December 2001), 4–5 (citing S and T v Sweden,
supra n 21).
24 In most European jurisdictions, shareholders can usually act in concert without burdensome
regulatory reporting requirements to influence the board. For instance, some jurisdictions only
require 5 or 10% of a class of voting shares to propose resolutions, put issues on the agenda or call
extraordinary shareholder meetings. In contrast, US law imposes extensive disclosure
requirements on the communications and actions of shareholders who act in concert and together
control 5% or more of a class of voting shares in a public company.
25 See J Dine, Company Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 120–21 (discussing English case law
on the equitable constraints of a shareholder exercising its right to vote). Moreover, in many civil
assets, and to amend the company articles or charter. In addition, most
jurisdictions require that shareholders vote on important structural changes in
the company, such as acquisitions and mergers, and whether the company will be
liquidated. Shareholders who own the same class of shares have a right to be
treated equally, and they are residual claimants who have a right to receive a
pro-rata portion of the company’s profits and assets, giving them a direct
economic interest in the success and profitability of the company. Minority
shareholders who vote against company reorganisations or major transactions
(eg acquisitions and mergers) are entitled to benefits which are approximately
equal to those received by controlling shareholders.
As discussed below, the Second Company Law Directive provides
shareholders in a public limited liability company with the right to approve any
proposal by the board or other party to increase or reduce the share capital of
the company.26 Moreover, the Directive lays down procedures27 for an offer of
subscription on a pre-emptive basis which must be offered to the shareholders of
a public limited liability company whenever the capital is increased by
consideration in cash.28 This raises the important issue of pre-emptive rights for
shareholders in public companies and how it is regulated under EC law.29
Pre-emptive rights entitle a shareholder to be offered the right to purchase a
proportionate number of shares in order to maintain its percentage of
ownership and voting control. By having the right to approve the decision of
directors to alter the company’s capital, shareholders can attach conditions to the
issuance of new shares which can prevent the dilution of their equity interest in
the company and the loss of their control rights.30
Under US law, the primary source for shareholder rights is state law.31 As with
most European jurisdictions, common shareholders are viewed as residual
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law jurisdictions, shareholders would have a right to elect directors to the supervisory board. This
is the case, for instance, under French and German law. See M Menjucq, “Corporate Governance
Issues in France” in JJ Norton and J Rickford (eds), Corporate Governance Post-Enron (London, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2006), 101–15 and UH Schneider, “Corporate
Governance Issues in Germany—Between Golden October and Nasty November”, idem, 143–50.
26 Directive 77/91/EEC (13 December 1976), Art 25. See C Villiers, European Company Law—
Towards Democracy? (Aldershot, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1998), 34, 137–41 (discussing the Directive’s
requirement of minimum capital, maintenance of share capital, and rules for shareholder
approval of an increase or reduction in capital).
27 Art 29 (3). See E Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press, 2007), 136–37,
discussing UK implementation and procedures.
28 Art 29 (1). See ECJ’s discussion in Pafatis, para 29.
29 Arts 25 and 29 of Directive 77/91/EEC have provided the legal basis for the adoption of
pre-emptive rights for shareholders in public limited liability companies in EU states. For an
analysis of the regulatory requirements for rights issues under EC and UK law and a critique that
they are too cumbersome along with options for reform, see E Ferran, “What’s Wrong With
Rights Issues?” (2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 523.
30 Art 25 of Directive 77/91/EEC.
31 See generally M Eisenberg, “The Structure of Corporation Law” (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review
1461.
claimants of the corporation because of their claim on profits and assets upon
liquidation.32 Regarding control rights, common shareholders can vote for
directors to act on their behalf. The legal relationship, however, between the
shareholders and the directors is not legally one of agency, as the “principals (the
shareholders) do not control the decisions of the agent (the directors)”.33 Upon
election, the directors have fiduciary duties to act in the best economic interests
of the company and all its shareholders, not simply for the shareholders who
elected them. Under the majority of state statutes, ordinary business decisions
are made by the Board, while structural or governance decisions are made by the
shareholders.34
Regarding pre-emption rights under US law, the federal securities laws do not
afford shareholders with pre-emption rights. US commentators rationalise this
by arguing that shareholders in a publicly traded corporation are less concerned
with pre-emptive rights “because they are passive investors and have no
expectation of maintaining their percentage ownership”.35 The stock exchange
rules of several major US exchanges, however, provide strong shareholder voting
rights which corporations must adhere to in order to keep their listing. For
example, the New York Stock Exchange requires shareholder voting and
approval for a company to issue new shares if the new shares significantly dilute
the existing value of shares.36 Nevertheless, US pre-emption rights are generally
more limited than those offered under the company laws of most EU states.37
Indeed, the availability of pre-emption rights for shareholders in public limited
liability companies under Article 29 of the Second Directive suggests that
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32 See Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), s 6.03 (c) (requiring that outstanding
shares have unlimited voting rights and that are entitled to receive the net assets of the
corporation upon dissolution).
33 R Pinto and DM Branson, Understanding Corporate Law (New York, Mathew Bender & Co, 1999),
93.
34 In certain circumstances, however, the Board can take governance decisions as well. A majority of
state statutes permit the board to decide matters which are also listed as shareholder rights, but
the shareholders have a right to override the decision taken by the board. See RMBCA, s 10.20
(bylaws giving the board the power to amend the bylaws also provide the shareholders with power
to override the board’s amendments).
35 See Pinto and Branson, supra n 33, 73. They also argue that the “mechanics” of first offering
newly issued shares in public markets would be unduly burdensome if the shares granted
pre-emptive rights.
36 New York Stock Exchange Euronext Listed Company Manual, s 312 (d), which provides that
‘[s]hareholder approval is required prior to an issuance that will result in a change of control of
the issuer.’ Section 312 (c) defines control as ‘voting power equal to or in excess of 20 percent’, or
‘the number of shares equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the number of shares of common stock
outstanding before the issuance of the common stock’.
37 For example, US state corporation laws have a variety of approaches regarding how pre-emption
rights are treated. Under Delaware law, there is a presumption of no pre-emption rights unless
they are provided expressly in the Arts. DGCL, § 102(b)(3). Other states, such as New York and
Florida, provide for pre-emption rights unless a company expressly opts-out in its Arts.
shareholders in European companies have stronger legal protections against the
alteration or change without their consent of the capital structure of public
companies. Member state law or a company’s charter cannot derogate from this
right.
Generally, shareholders in US companies exercise a more limited number of
substantive powers that include the election of directors and approval of
amendments to the charter or bylaws, acquisition and mergers, the sale of
substantial corporate assets, and voluntary dissolution. Shareholders in
European companies, by contrast, are statutorily mandated to vote on more
strategic matters, such as whether to spin-off divisions or, in the case of capital
raising, whether to alter or increase the company’s capital, including whether to
waive pre-emptive rights related to an increase in company capital.
Some commentators argue that the rights of shareholders are more firmly
implanted under European law than US law.38 It is argued that US corporation
law allows the articles and bylaws to be written in a way that places most
governance power with the board.39 For instance, the limitation of shareholder
rights under some US state laws can be demonstrated in the case of Delaware, a
popular state for registration and as a headquarters for many major US
corporations.40 In contrast, under most European jurisdictions, the shareholders’
meeting is the source of most governance powers that are not given by statute to
the board. Company charters or shareholder resolutions are prohibited from
delegating power to the board that is statutorily mandated to be exercised in the
shareholders’ meeting.41 Thus, shareholders in European Economic Area (EEA)
companies exercise more governance powers over the internal operations of the
company than do shareholders in US companies.
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38 Hüpkes, supra n 17.
39 This view appears to be supported by Delaware law. DGCL, § 141(a) stipulates that “[t]he
business and affairs of every [corporation] shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation”.
40 The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) provides that the Arts of incorporation may
contain “any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation,
the directors, and the shareholders.” Thus, the board typically holds all powers that are not
explicitly reserved for the shareholders.
41 Limited exceptions exist where the statute authorises such a delegation, for instance, regarding
limits of the transfer of shares.
D. THE PROTECTION OF BANK SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
1. The ECHR42
A shareholder’s ownership interest in a company’s capital stock has been
recognised as protected “possessions”, and is thus a property right under Article
1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.43 The article states:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”
The European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) has interpreted
the provision to be composed of three rules: first, the principle of the peaceful
enjoyment of property; secondly, no one shall be deprived of property except
subject to conditions prescribed by law and in the public interest; and thirdly,
contracting states are entitled, among other things, to control the use of property
according to the general interest. The ECtHR observed that ‘[t]he three rules are
not, however, “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected’, and ‘[t]he second
and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the
right to lawful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the
light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.’44 In considering Article
I, the court has observed that a “company share is a complex thing”. It certifies
that the holder possesses a share in the company together with corresponding
rights. This is an indirect claim on not only company assets “but other rights,
especially voting rights and the right to influence the company, which may follow
the share”.45
The Strasbourg Court has ruled that shares in a company have economic
value and therefore constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol 1.46 In Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, the applicant company initially held
a 49% stake in a Ukrainian company Sovtransavto-Lugansk. Following the
decision of a state agency ordering the company to raise significantly more
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42 Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 312 UNTS 221 (adopted at Paris on 20 March 1952; entered into force on 18 May
1954; hereinafter ECHR Protocol).
43 Art 1 of Protocol No 1, European Convention of Human Rights.
44 Beyeler v Italy, ECtHR, No 33202/96 (Judgment, 5 January 2000) 23. Moreover, the court stated in
paragraph 111 that “[a]ny interference with the enjoyment of a right or freedom recognised by
the Convention must, . . . pursue a legitimate aim”. Ibid, 111.
45 See S and T v Sweden, supra n 21.
46 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, ECtHR (27 September 2001), 937.
outside share capital, the percentage held by the applicant company was reduced
to 20.7%. The relative decline in the applicant company’s share holdings in the
company had the result of limiting its ability to influence the direction and
management of the company and protect its investment. The Court held that
the manner in which the domestic court proceedings were conducted and
resolved, and the uncertainty in which the applicant shareholder was left, upset
the “fair balance” that was required to be struck between the demands of the
public interest and the need to protect the applicant shareholder’s right to the
enjoyment of its possessions. Consequently, the state failed to comply with its
obligation to secure to the applicant shareholder the effective enjoyment of its
property right. The case supports the view that Article 1 of Protocol 1 protects
shareholders against direct and indirect forms of property deprivation and
interference by governmental authorities.
Of particular significance to financial holding companies, conglomerates and
institutional investors, it should be emphasised that the protection of private
property under the ECHR applies to “every natural and legal person”.47
Accordingly, the protections of the ECHR are applicable to companies or other
business entities who are shareholders in other companies, which means, for
example, that shares in banking companies owned by parent companies would
attract property rights protection under the ECHR. Moreover, the Strasbourg
Court has interpreted Article 1 of Protocol 1 as having a broad application that
includes the rights of shareholders in a public company who, as a result of a
merger between their company and another company, were obliged to exchange
their shares in the former company for shares in the latter company at an
unfavourable rate.48 The Court held that the protection sought by the
shareholder could include a guarantee that the terms of the share exchange were
appropriate and did not constitute an unlawful deprivation of property.49
Nevertheless, the court recognises that these rights are not absolute and may be
restricted in a number of ways, provided that certain legal protections are
observed.50
2. EU Legislation
EU Company Law Directives provide strong protections for certain shareholder
rights.51 The Second Company Law Directive (Second Directive) contains the
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48 Offerhaus and Offerhaus v the Netherlands, No 35730/97 (16 December 2001).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. In addition, Art 6(1) ECHR suggests that property rights in shares are “civil rights”, which
means that disputes concerning a state’s interference in property rights in shares must comply
with guarantees of due process. See discussion below.
51 The Second Directive, 77/91/EEC (formation of public companies and change of capital
approval); the Third Directive, 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Art 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, [1978] OJ L295, 36–43 (Art 7
rules for formation of a public limited liability company and for the equal
treatment of shareholders who own the same class of shares in approving the
capital structure of their company.52 To this end, Article 25(1) requires that the
shareholder general meeting approve any alteration, increase or decrease in the
company’s subscribed capital.53 Moreover, shareholder approval at the general
meeting is required to authorise the board to restrict or withdraw the
pre-emption rights of existing shareholders.54 Indeed, a shareholder’s right to
maintain its proportional share of its holding in the issued capital of a public
limited liability company has been recognised by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ)  as  an  inherent  right  for  shareholders.55 Shareholders  may  approve  an
opt-out, however, from their pre-emption rights for a maximum period of five
years by passing a resolution at a general meeting.56
The ECJ has interpreted the Second Directive as protecting the rights of
shareholders against any change without approval of the company’s capital
structure, internal governance procedures and formation.57 The most important
ECJ case to deal with regulatory intervention in the governance of a banking
company’s capital structure was Panagis Pafitis v Greece.58 In Pafatis the court
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provides that a merger requires the approval of the general meeting of each of the merging
companies). Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Art 54(3)(g) of
the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies, [1982] OJ L378, 47–54
(Arts 5 and 6 on company spin-offs); Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, [2004] OJ L142, 0012–23 (provides for
“squeeze-out” rights of the majority shareholder and “sell-out” rights of minority shareholders in
the context of takeover bids).
52 See Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States
of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art 48 of the Treaty, in respect of
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their
capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, [1977] OJ L26, 0001–13. The
numbering of Art 48 was changed from Art 58 of the Treaty by Art 12 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. See CJ Hopt and E Wymeersch European Company and Financial Law (Oxford
University Press, 2004), 284.
53 Art 25(1) of the Second Directive. Similar provisions apply to any reduction of subscribed capital.
54 Art 29(4) of the Second Directive. See Case C–338/06 Commission of the European Communities v
Kingdom of Spain, judgment of 18 December 2008 (declaring that Spain’s law granting pre-emptive
rights in shares to convertible bondholders and pre-emptive rights in convertible bonds to
convertible bondholders, and by failing to provide that the shareholders’ meeting may decide to
withdraw pre-emptive rights for shareholders in bonds convertible into shares, violated Art 29 of
the Second Council Directive).
55 Siemens AG/Nold [1996] ECR I–6017, opinion of 19 September 1996, para 15 (cited in Commission
of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain, supra n 54, paras 23 and 26).
56 Art 40 of the Second Directive. The resolution can be renewed without limit based on one of two
types of majority vote: (i) two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting; or (ii) if 50% or
more of the shares entitled to vote are present at the meeting, then a simple majority is required to
carry the resolution.
57 C–19/90 and C–20/90 Karella and Karellas v Minister for Industry, Energy and Technology and Organismos
Anasygkrotiseos Epicheiriseon AE [1991] ECR I–2691, para 30; and C–381/89 Syndesmos Melon tis
Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias and others v Greek State and others [1992] ECR I–2111, para 27.
58 C–441/93 Pafitis and Others v TKE and Others [1996] ECR I–1347.
reviewed a Greek banking regulation that allowed the Greek National Bank to
appoint a temporary administrator to manage the affairs of a bank that took the
form of a public limited liability company under Article 25 of the Second
Directive. The bank was heavily indebted and posed a serious risk to depositors,
and thereby threatened banking stability. Under the regulation, the administrator
suspended the governance rights of the shareholders and passed resolutions
increasing the bank’s share capital. The government initially subscribed to shares
which gave it a controlling interest in the bank. Later, the administrator directed
the bank to issue more shares through several rights issues, in which existing
shareholders were offered to purchase a proportional amount of shares. The
original shareholders refused these offers, however, because their interest had
been significantly diluted when the government initially injected capital. The
Greek court upheld the administrator’s authority to reorganise the bank and to
raise capital without shareholder approval on the grounds that banking
corporations were subject to a different set of supervisory laws and that this
justified derogation from the shareholder rights protections in Article 25 of the
Directive. The ECJ overruled the national court by holding that under these
circumstances Greek banking law could not derogate from the minimum
protections afforded shareholders in public limited liability companies under the
Second Directive.59
The court’s judgment acknowledged that considerations to protect the
interests of depositors and, more generally, banking stability required strict
supervisory rules, but it did not agree that the sweeping powers granted to the
administrator to reorganise the heavily indebted bank without shareholder
approval was necessary to protect depositors. The exercise of these powers to
recapitalise the bank without shareholder approval therefore violated the
minimum standards of shareholder protection in Articles 25 and 29. The court
accepted the Advocate General’s argument that the Greek supervisory rules were
not necessary to achieve the regulatory objectives, as these could have been
achieved by other means, such as through a comprehensive deposit insurance
scheme, which would have achieved the same regulatory objective of protecting
depositors while not interfering with shareholder rights under Article 25. In
other words, it was possible in this case for the Member State, if its regulations
did not meet the requirements of the Directive, to adjust its supervisory rules to
achieve both their regulatory objectives and the minimum requirements of
shareholder protection. Moreover, the court observed that the bank
reorganisation measures which Greek authorities had taken were not
“execution” measures in the sense that they could suspend company governance
rights. Crucially, the court stated:
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“the directive does not, admittedly, preclude the taking of execution measures intended
to put an end to the company’s existence and, in particular, does not preclude
liquidation measures placing the company under compulsory administration with a
view to safeguarding the rights of creditors. However, the directive continues to apply
where ordinary reorganization measures are taken in order to ensure the survival of
the company, even if those measures mean that the shareholders and the normal
organs of the company are temporarily divested of their powers.”60
The court held that the appointment of a temporary administrator under Greek
law did not resemble an “execution measure” or even a “liquidation measure”,
even though all the powers and competencies of the company organs were
transferred to the administrator.61 The court made a distinction between the
measures that could have been taken under Greek law that would have resulted
in the withdrawal of the bank’s licence and its liquidation, and the appointment
of a temporary administrator that would allow the bank to continue its
operations as before. Indeed, the vesting of all powers and competencies of the
organs of the company with the administrator was only temporary and all
subsequent capital increases following the initial one directed by the temporary
administrator were approved by the new shareholders. This proved that the
company was not executed into insolvency and that the appointment of the
temporary administrator was to ensure the company’s survival and therefore
could not justify extinguishing the rights of the original shareholders, thus
violating shareholder rights under Articles 25 and 29 of the Directive.
The Pafitis case establishes the importance of protecting a shareholder’s
minimum control and economic rights in a company, even if there is an
important regulatory objective for interfering with these rights.62 EU Member
States may not adopt bank regulatory measures that infringe minimum
shareholder rights, including their right to approve any change in the capital
structure of the banking corporation or to purchase shares pre-emptively, or to
approve the acquisition or merger of the bank or a spinoff of one of its
divisions. Some commentators argue that the ECJ would decide the case
differently today63 because when the ECJ made its decision in 1996 Greece had
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62 Ibid, para 60. See Hupkes, supra n 17, 63 (arguing that “had the Directive on the reorganization
and winding-up of credit institutions been adopted, the conclusion reached by the court might
have been different” because “[t]he Directive could have been considered as lex specialis posterior
and the Greek administration measure could have been recognized as a ‘reorganization measure’
within the meaning of the Directive”). See discussion below.
63 See E Hüpkes, “Learning Lessons and Implementing a New Approach—Bank Insolvency
Resolution in Switzerland” in DG Mayes and A Liuksila (eds), Who Pays for Bank Insolvency? (New
York, Palgrave, 2003).
not fully implemented the Second Directive and the Winding-up Directive of
2001 had not been enacted.64
The Winding-up Directive of 2001 provides “‘reorganisation measures’ as
measures which are intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of a
credit institution and which could affect third parties’ pre-existing rights”. The
definition of “third parties’ pre-existing rights” is crucial for determining
whether reorganisation measures can limit pre-existing shareholder rights. If the
definition includes shareholder rights, then such rights can be restricted in
derogation from the Company Law Directives in a bank reorganisation outside
insolvency.65 If a narrower definition is adopted, however, then reorganisation
measures would presumably apply only to creditors, such as depositors, and
other third party claimants against the bank, and would not therefore interfere
with shareholder rights under EU law. It has been suggested that the European
Commission should compile a list of national regulatory measures that Member
States could take to reorganise a bank outside insolvency which could derogate
from shareholder rights under EU directives and European Human Rights law.66
In the meantime, the Pafitis case remains the law and suggests that the Second
Directive prohibits Member State authorities from suspending shareholder rights
(except in cases of absolute necessity) in order to provide a temporary
administrator with authority to inject state capital into a weakened bank on an
expedited basis or to entice new investors which will dilute the equity interests of
existing shareholders.
E. REGULATORY ACTION AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
A financial crisis can lead to a sudden loss of investor confidence in a bank’s
securities and may require a regulator to act quickly outside of normal corporate
governance rules to recapitalise or restructure it. Europe and the US take
different approaches. Under EU law, regulators are restricted from acting quickly
in restructuring a bank which is not insolvent without ex ante shareholder
approval. For instance, if a regulator requires a bank to recapitalise itself by
issuing new shares, the Second Directive requires that a majority of shareholders
approve the recapitalisation and that the shareholders have pre-emption rights
over the newly issued shares. Although most EU state regulators have authority
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64 See Directive on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (Directive 2001/24/EC
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1346/2000 of 29 May 2000) and another directive concerning the reorganisation and winding-up
of insurance undertakings (Directive 2001/17/EC of 19 March 2001).
65 RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford University Press, 2006),
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to take measures that may affect shareholder control or economic rights, they
must ordinarily obtain majority approval by shareholders. In contrast, US federal
banking law allows the regulator broad discretion to order an ailing bank to take
prompt corrective action to recapitalise itself or to take some other action that
could alter the governance rights of shareholders without their approval. These
different approaches present various degrees of regulatory intrusiveness into the
corporate governance of banks and will be discussed below.
1. Pre-intervention Measures
Banking supervision involves the supervisor monitoring the financial health of
the bank and in certain circumstances calling upon bank managers to strengthen
the bank’s position by enhancing its regulatory capital, changing the composition
of its assets, reducing the concentration of its asset exposures or other prudential
measures. Such supervisory guidance may in the first instance be voluntary and
merely an effort by the supervisor to inform the bank of perceived regulatory
weaknesses. Under US prompt corrective action, the regulator may, before
deciding whether to impose mandatory measures, exhort bank management to
increase regulatory capital by, for instance, recapitalising itself.67 In this scenario,
it would be the decision of management and in some states it would require
shareholder approval to increase the bank’s capital. Similarly, the Chairman of
the French Banking Commission can invite the bank managers or shareholders
to take corrective action to cure any perceived regulatory weaknesses.68 The UK
Financial Services Authority (FSA) has followed a flexible risk-based approach in
which supervisors engage in a dialogue with bank management and use
voluntary guidance to influence the bank’s prudential practices.69 Through
dialogue and veiled pressure, most banks are likely to take corrective measures to
satisfy the concerns of their supervisor. In certain cases, however, more forceful
regulatory action may be necessary.
2. Limitations on Shareholder Rights
Shareholder rights in a bank may be restricted by prudential regulatory action
pre-insolvency. Indeed, the Core Principles of Banking Supervision recommend
that supervisors have the authority to establish fit and proper requirements for
bank directors, which limits whom shareholders can vote for as directors.70 The
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67 Section 38(a) of the Federal Insurance Corporation Act of 1991 sets forth the statutory
requirements for a well-capitalised bank and the various stages of regulatory intervention all the
way from voluntary guidance to a cease and desist order and sanctions.
68 Art L511-42 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
69 See Financial Services Authority, “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: FSA Responsi-
bilities” Discussion Paper (December 2008), 5 (referring to the earliest stage of risk-based
regulation).
70 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Principle 3.
Core Principles also restrict the acquisition of controlling interest in a banking
institution to those investors who can demonstrate compliance with prudential
safeguards (ie source of strength requirements).71 Regulatory restrictions on
management may include large exposure limits on the banks lending portfolio
and asset allocation rules for the bank’s proprietary trading. During a financial
crisis, many jurisdictions provide that regulators may suspend shareholder
corporate governance rights and procedures in order to protect depositors and to
restore a bank’s financial health.72 As discussed in Pafatis, special resolution
procedures for banks may provide for a conservatorship whereby the regulator or
central bank appoints an official to take control of the bank’s operations. Such
action may interfere with shareholder control rights and may also lead to a
suspension of more fundamental rights, such as the right to elect directors, to call
a special shareholder meeting and to submit resolutions to elect new—or remove
existing—directors.73 The value of the shareholders’ interest may be further
depleted or eliminated if the regulator decides to transfer some or all of the
bank’s viable assets to a state-owned bridge bank or to sell them to a private
purchaser, such as another bank, while leaving the original bank with mostly
unviable assets.74 In some cases, regulatory action may lead to the bank’s
financial health being restored, in which case pre-resolution shareholder rights
would be restored.
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71 Core Principle 4.
72 For example, the Bank of Italy can suspend shareholder rights at the general meeting and appoint
a special administrator who has the authority to convene a general meeting and to increase the
bank’s capital stock if the Minister of Economy and Finance has issued a decree to increase,
underwrite or guarantee an increase in the bank’s capital stock. Law Decrees No 155 of 9 October
2008 and No 157 of 13 October 2008. Similarly, the German Banking Act was amended in 2009
to allow the German supervisory authority BaFin to suspend current bank management and
appoint a temporary administrator who can authorise an increase in bank capital without
shareholder approval.
73 Under French law, the Banking Commission can appoint a temporary administrator with powers
to manage and act on behalf of the bank. Arts L613-18 and L613-22 of the Monetary and
Financial Code. Similarly, the Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) can
appoint a special inspector with enhanced administration powers. Swiss law also provides the
regulator with powers to appoint a special administrator to govern the bank’s affairs and more
extended powers. Art 23-quater of the Swiss Banking Act. Moreover, the Swiss regulator can
likewise impose a forced reorganisation with changes to the capital structure that are not subject
to shareholder approval. See Art 29, s 3 of the Swiss Banking Act; see Hupkes, supra note 17,
70–74. See also RH Weber and T Iseli, “Das Interne Kontrollsystem im Aktien- und
Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht” (2008) 1 Haftung und Versicherung 19.
74 Norwegian law provides for a public administration regime that allows for a compulsory
reorganisation and override of the shareholders. The Norwegian supervisor may stipulate that the
share capital shall be increased by a new subscription for shares and designate eligible investors to
subscribe for the shares, thus diluting existing shareholders. Sections 3–5 of the Act on Guarantee
Schemes for Banks and Public Administration etc, of Financial Institutions (Guarantee Schemes
Act) of 6 December 1996 (as amended per 1 July 2004). Similarly, the French Banking Com-
mission may request the courts to order the transfer of shares to another entity. Art L613-25 of the
Monetary and Financial Code.
F. LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO INFORM REGULATORY POLICY DEBATE
Shareholder rights have been recognised as rights to property under the ECHR
and are given protective status under European Community legislation.
Nevertheless, the exercise of shareholder rights are subject to a number of
qualifications and conditions as set forth in national laws and regulatory regimes.
The ECHR has been interpreted as balancing these competing interests while
recognising legitimate expectations in property rights and the state’s prerogative
to regulate the economy and to take extraordinary measures during a crisis. State
oversight of the banking sector and the exercise of regulatory authority should
be anchored in certain legal principles. In designing financial regulation,
incentives structures should be developed for both ex ante prudential regulation
and ex post crisis management measures that emphasise market-based solutions to
financial sector failures while providing adequate state resources to manage a
crisis effectively and to contain any spillover effects onto the broader economy.
The regulatory regime should also incentivise shareholders to take on more
responsibility for recapitalising a troubled bank and redesigning compensation
for management so that the bank’s risks are more efficiently allocated between
long- and short-term investments.
1. The Principle of Legality
The principle of legality encompasses legal certainty and coherence. This
requires that regulatory action that interferes with property rights be based on a
coherent legal framework in which the conditions justifying the regulator’s action
must be set out in law or regulation. This principle of legality has been
recognised by the Strasbourg Court and is reflected in the language of Article 1
of Protocol 1.75 In addition, the principle is reflected in the comprehensive legal
framework governing bank shareholder expectations under the US prompt
corrective action regime. In section 302(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act of 1991 the US Congress expressly defined a “risk-based
assessment system” as:
“a system for calculating a depository institution’s semiannual assessment based on—
(i) the probability that the deposit insurance fund will incur a loss with respect to the
institution, taking into consideration the risks attributable to—
(I) different categories and concentrations of assets;
(II) different categories and concentrations of liabilities, both insured and
uninsured, contingent and non-contingent; and
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75 Indeed, Art 1 of Protocol 1 states in the relevant part that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law”.
(III) any other factors the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)]
determines are relevant to assessing such probability;
(ii) the likely amount of any such loss; and
(iii) the revenue needs of the deposit fund.76
The FDIC uses this risk-based classification system as the legal basis from which
to require banks to produce detailed reports and expert evaluations of the bank’s
financial condition. The FDIC’s regulations require the agency to analyse
objective “capital” factors as well as subjective “supervisory” factors.77 The
capital factors determine the institution’s “capital group”, which is one of five
categories, signified as a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, in the risk classification.78 The supervisory
risk factors determine the institution’s “supervisory sub-group”, signified as A, B
or C in the risk classification.79 Further, the regulations provide that the FDIC
will assign an institution a supervisory subgroup based on the FDIC’s
“consideration of supervisory evaluations provided by the institution’s primary
federal regulator”.80
The supervisor has the authority to act if the bank’s capital drops into the
lower three categories. The FDIC is required to appoint a conservator or
receiver if the bank’s capital drops to the lowest category, designated as
“critically undercapitalised”. The FDIC may exercise forbearance in exceptional
circumstances where it has agreed with the relevant federal bank regulator that
receivership or conservatorship would likely result in significant market
turbulence and would further damage depositors’ interest.81
The US prompt corrective action regime enhances legality by providing
trigger points that determine when a particular regulatory action can be taken,
thereby enhancing legal certainty while allowing the regulator the flexibility not
to apply an enhanced regulatory measure if it might exacerbate market
conditions (ie a financial crisis) or worsen depositors’ interest. Shareholder
expectations are thus enhanced by having their property rights subject to a
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77 FDIC v Coushatta, 930 F 2d 122 (5th Cir), cert denied, 502 US 857 (1991).
78 A supervisor may classify a bank in one of the following categories: (1) Well Capitalised banks have a
total risk-based capital ratio of at least 10%, a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of at least 6%, a
leverage ratio of at least 5%, in which case they may not be subject to an order, written agreement
or directive relating to capital; (2) Adequately Capitalised institutions have a total risk-based capital
ratio of at least 8%, a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of at least 4% and a leverage ratio of at least
4% (or a leverage ratio of at least 3% if the institution has a supervisory rating of 1); (3)
Undercapitalised institutions are those which fail to meet the requirements of an adequately
capitalised institution; (4) Significantly Undercapitalised institutions are those with a total risk-based
capital ratio of less than 6%, a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of less than 3% or a leverage ratio of
less than 3%; and (5) Critically Undercapitalised institutions are those with a less than 2% tangible
equity to total asset ratio.
79 12 CFR § 327.3 (e)(1).
80 12 CFR § 327.3(e)(1)(ii).
81 The relevant regulator and the FDIC must review their decision not to appoint a conservator or
receiver once every 90 days.
prescriptive legislative and regulatory regime in which there are clear
expectations about what will happen to their control and economic interests if
the bank’s conditions deteriorate. The expectation of the loss of control or the
dilution of share value acts to discipline shareholders to exercise more effective
oversight of bank management and to influence management to take less socially
risky behaviour. Moreover, if the bank cannot be salvaged, the regulations
providing for receivership or conservatorship allow for an efficient winding up of
the bank with depositors being reimbursed from the deposit insurance fund and
the FDIC acting as residual claimant on any surplus assets in the estate.
Financial liberalisation, securitisation and wholesale funding, and how they
contributed to the recent financial crisis, raise important issues regarding how
the principle of legality can be applied to regulate globalised and securitised
financial markets where banks and financial firms are threatened equally, if not
more, by liquidity risk, rather than credit risk.82 Liquidity in financial markets
depends on there being a balance between risk absorbers (purchasers of assets)
and risk traders (sellers of assets).83 Funding liquidity depends on this balance
being maintained, which requires that regulatory intervention not upset this
balance, nor exacerbate the imbalance in a turbulent period.84 To supervise firms
in the area of liquidity risk management requires that shareholders invest their
capital in lower yielding assets which can be more quickly liquidated at face
value during a crisis. Prescriptive trigger points, as in prompt corrective action,
may be inappropriate, but this does not preclude the use of other mechanical
reference points, such as liquidity ratios and ratios of maturity mismatches in
volatile asset classes. Liquidity risk supervision, however, should not focus
exclusively on numerical reference points, but should also contain an ample level
of regulatory discretion to allow the supervisor to adjust regulatory techniques in
response to market developments and financial innovation. Although prescriptive
regimes enhance legal certainty and the stability of expectations of market
participants, they may prove obsolete rather quickly as the sources of systemic
risk evolve in complex global markets. The one certain lesson that supervisors
can take away from the credit crisis has been that bank failures can arise, along
with virulent financial distress, from unexpected liquidity shocks that are
unrelated to the balance sheet health and capital adequacy of the bank or
financial institution. This type of liquidity freeze can occur without warning to
shareholders and thus result in regulatory intervention where none was expected.
This could potentially undermine the principle of legality as a criterion for
regulatory intervention.
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2. Regulatory Discretion and Due Process
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR provides that shareholders should have
reasonable opportunity and coherent procedures upon which to act in contesting
regulatory actions which interfere with their property rights. The court
considered the right to due process in Olczak v Poland,85 where the shares held by
the complaining shareholder had constituted approximated 45% of the bank’s
equity capital before the receivers appointed by the National Bank of Poland
took control of the bank and reduced the nominal value of its share capital to
cover some of the substantial losses which the bank had incurred. Following this,
the receivers authorised the bank to issue a new class of non-transferable shares
with extra voting rights which were subscribed to and paid for by the National
Bank of Poland. The complaining shareholder, whose equity interest dropped to
0.4%, was prohibited from subscribing to any additional shares. The substantial
dilution of the shareholder’s ownership interest led to a corresponding loss of
control over the affairs and management of the bank. The court ruled that,
although the shareholder had standing to allege that its rights under Article 1 of
Protocol 1 were infringed, the bank’s substantial losses and irregular practices
had put its customers’ deposits at risk and its possible bankruptcy threatened the
public interest by putting the financial system at risk.86
In a financial crisis, a regulator may need to act quickly, and this can
necessitate the setting aside of normal notice procedures for a party to contest a
regulatory action. In Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria,87 the Strasbourg Court ruled that
the legitimacy of a regulator’s decision to revoke a bank’s licence without
following normal procedures for notice and a hearing would depend on the
nature of the crisis in question and whether it was reasonable and necessary to
set aside the respondent party’s due process rights before suffering a property
deprivation.88 An important factor would be whether a subsequent hearing held
after the regulatory action was taken would not be too late by leading to
irreparable damage to the bank’s or shareholder’s rights. The court observed
that the principle of legality under the ECHR prohibits the state from taking
arbitrary and capricious state action and requires that any action depriving a
person or entity of its property be a proportionate measure that achieves the
public interest.89 Article 1 of Protocol 1 requires that procedural guarantees be in
place to allow the individual or entity to contest the state action in question by
presenting their views to an independent and impartial tribunal.
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The requirement for an impartial tribunal implicates article 6 of the ECHR,
which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . .
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing. . . by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”
The Strasbourg Court has interpreted property rights to be equivalent to civil
rights within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR. Therefore, regulatory action
that deprives a shareholder of its ownership interest in a company’s stock
requires that fair procedures be available to the shareholder to object before an
impartial tribunal. It is recognised, however, that such procedures can be set
aside in exceptional circumstances in which it is necessary for regulatory action
to be taken immediately, such as in a banking crisis or other financial market
turbulence where the financial system may be at serious risk.90
In addition, Article 13 ECHR provides: “Everyone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The right of access to court, however, may be restricted in exceptional
circumstances where the state has a legitimate purpose and the means employed
to achieve that purpose are proportionate. The determination of a legitimate
purpose was at issue in Camberrow MM5 AD v Bulgaria,91 where the Strasbourg
Court held that the bankruptcy trustee’s sale of an insolvent bank in an
expedited manner and as a going concern without court approval was necessary
to achieve a higher recovery for creditors, and that this justified the setting aside
of the consultation and notice requirements of the insolvency procedure.
Adhering to the insolvency procedures, which had required full consultations
with all creditors and stakeholders over an extended period of time, would have
jeopardised the quick sale of the bankrupt bank for a price satisfactory to most
creditors. In its decision, the court reasoned that emergency state measures such
as these “enjoy[ed] a wider margin of appreciation” if they were taken “in
delicate economic areas such as the stability of the banking system”. It
concluded that it was not disproportionate for the regulator to restrict the
participation of shareholders in the negotiations over the insolvent bank’s estate
if the result was that the bank could be sold promptly as a going concern while
providing a higher recovery for creditors from the bankruptcy estate.
Shareholder rights can also be implicated by the type and scope of judicial
review available to challenge regulatory action. Article 6 ECHR requires judicial
review of the exercise of state administrative decisions that interfere with
property rights. This means that regulatory action that is upheld by an adminis-
trative tribunal must still be subject to judicial review de novo on questions of fact
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and issues of law that relate to the dispute.92 In Credit and Industrial Bank v the Czech
Republic,93 the court ruled that the limited scope of judicial review available under
Czech law to challenge the insolvency administrator’s factual determination of
compulsory administration for a Czech bank had violated Article 6(1) on the
grounds that the bank’s controlling shareholder who had challenged the
determination was left with no option but to appeal the finding to an adminis-
trative or judicial tribunal.
In contrast, shareholders in US banks have narrower grounds to challenge
regulatory decisions and actions under US banking law. For instance, US courts
have examined whether FDIC procedures for issuing capital directives to banks
satisfied due process requirements of the US Constitution. The Fifth Circuit
Court Appeals held in FDIC v Coushatta94 that the FDIC must adhere to a
three-factor inquiry that courts are required to use in determining what type of
procedures satisfy due process before the government may deprive an entity of a
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments.95 The three factors are: (i) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (ii) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (iii) the government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute requirement would entail.96 Essentially, due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.97
In assessing prudential supervisory practices, the Fifth Circuit in Coushatta
concluded that procedures for determining capital adequacy and risk-based
supervisory ratings satisfied due process. The court reasoned that the private
interest of accurate capital directives is significant but that the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of property because of the application of a directive is
marginal. The court noted that a pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing (as
opposed to an informal hearing) was not warranted because a bank has adequate
opportunity to respond to the notice through written procedures. Also, the court
found that the government’s interests were substantial because delay would
considerably weaken the benefits from a prompt directive, which would seek to
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93 Credit and Industrial Bank v the Czech Republic, ECtHR, No 29010/95, Final Judgment (21 October
2003) 19–22.
94 930 F 2d 122 (5th Cir), cert denied, 502 US 857 (1991).
95 The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner”. Matthews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333 (1976).
96 Coushatta, supra n 77, 335.
97 Ibid, 334.
rectify a bank’s troublesome undercapitalisation. Similarly, in Doolin, the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the procedures allowing a bank to challenge an FDIC
determination of risk-based capital ratings, and found the procedure to be in
compliance with constitutional standards of due process.98
The FDIC procedure allowing banks to contest their risk-based capital ratings
meets the due process test because it provides banks with notice of their risk
classifications and an opportunity to challenge the classification through the
review procedures established in the regulations.99 Accordingly, the courts have
held that the due process clause does not require a pre-deprivation evidentiary
hearing before a particular risk-based weighting is applied to banks’ capital
position.100
Similarly, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)101 has discretion to
determine whether the business activities of savings banks are “unsafe or
unsound practices” and thus in violation of prudential supervisory standards of
federal banking law. Such determinations may only be overruled by a court if it
concludes that the agency action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion, and that there is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of
regularity and correctness afforded to the appointment. The courts have
generally upheld the discretionary authority of the OTS to apply prudential
supervisory standards to federal savings banks that rely on a combination of
objective and subjective standards for determining whether the bank was acting
in a prudential manner.102 These prudential assessments produce specific
composite ratings of each savings bank. Banks may challenge the risk-based
assessments that are applied to their activities by the OTS. The review procedure
involves a three-tier administrative review whereby an institution may challenge
its risk-based ratings at the district level of the OTS, and then may appeal the
decision to the OTS Director. Once administrative review with the OTS is
exhausted, an institution may seek review before an administrative law judge
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.103
Under the above legislation and regulations, US bank regulators have broader
discretion than their European counterparts to require a bank to recapitalise
itself and establish higher capital levels, and to change the bank’s business behav-
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Supervision determines that an informal oral presentation would be productive under the
applicable circumstances”. 58 Fed Reg 34357, 34359 (25 June 1993).
99 12 CFR § 327.3.
100 Doolin, 53 F 3d, 1403.
101 The OTS regulates and applies prudential supervisory standards to the operations of federal
savings banks that are not regulated by the Comptroller (Treasury) or by the Federal Reserve
Board.
102 See Doolin, supra n 100, 1405.
103 5 USC 702 (1998)(provides general right to judicial review of agency action).
iour if its activities constitute, in the regulator’s view, “unsafe and unsound”
banking practices.104 The contrasting approaches taken by the Strasbourg Court
and US Courts regarding the scope of judicial review that shareholders can
expect when regulatory action interferes with their property rights suggests that
European regulators may be more constrained and limited in the measures they
may adopt to achieve regulatory objectives, which could potentially undermine
the standard of banking supervision that is needed in today’s turbulent markets.
Nevertheless, the Strasbourg Court has also recognised the principle of the
margin of appreciation which allows states some discretion in devising their legal
and regulatory frameworks so as to comply with the fundamental principles of
the ECHR. Nevertheless, European law must provide individuals and business
entities with remedies to challenge administrative decisions on both factual and
legal grounds. Such remedies may lead to tribunals and courts deciding issues
involving specialised knowledge and expertise that is beyond their technical
capacities. In such cases, it should be considered that European states can
establish adjudicatory bodies with de novo review to examine the decisions and
actions taken by regulators to determine whether such regulatory intervention is
necessary if it infringes any fundamental principles of the ECHR, such as the
protection of shareholder property rights. Although the establishment of
appropriate tribunals is necessary to comply with Article 6, this should be
balanced by the need to have an expedited appeals process with time limits to
achieve legal finality.
3. Compensation for Interference with Shareholder Rights
Regulatory actions must also be considered with respect to any damages or losses
they impose on shareholders and third parties. Compensation terms should be
an important element in determining whether regulatory action is justifiable and
does not impose a disproportionate burden on specific individuals. The
Strasbourg Court has ruled that a government may expropriate private property,
but only on the condition that it pays adequate compensation, and that failure to
do so would be a disproportionate interference with property rights.105 In 1990 a
Dutch court ruled that, although minority shareholders in Nationale-
Nederlanden and NMB-Postbank respectively were entitled to compensation
after they refused to sell their minority interests to the offering purchaser
Internationale Nederlanden Groep NV, they were not entitled to have their
compensation determined by a valuation method that was most beneficial to
them. The temporary UK banking legislation enacted in 2008 provided that
shareholders were entitled to receive compensation if their shares were
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104 12 USC § 1818 (ii).
105 Former King of Greece and Others v Greece, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23
November 2000. See also Offerhaus and Offerhaus, supra n 48, 4–6 (acknowledging the right of
shareholders who hand over their shares in a merger to receive fair compensation).
transferred by HM Treasury to a public authority or private party.106 Under US
federal banking law, shareholders are entitled to receive the fair value of their
equity interest at the time of the appointment of a receiver. French law also
provides that, upon the application of the Banking Commission to obtain a
court-ordered share transfer, shareholders are entitled to apply for compensation
from the Commission.107
4. Limited Liability and Shareholder Rights
The principle of limited liability holds that shareholders are only personally
liable for the debts of the company to the extent of the value of their investment
in the company.108 As a general matter, creditors or other third party claimants
may not pierce the veil of incorporation with a private law claim to reach the
personal assets of investors which exceed the amount they invested in the
company except in narrowly defined circumstances.109 However, the public
regulatory law of many jurisdictions has afforded a growing number of remedies
for state agencies, regulatory bodies and private claimants to so recover assets
from parent companies and other controlling shareholders which exceed the
amount invested in the company. For example, under the National Banking Act
of 1863, the investors in banking corporations with federal charters were subject
to double liability based on the par value of the shares they owned. Similarly, in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many US states had double and
triple liability statutes for investors who owned shares in state-chartered banks. In
an era when there was no deposit insurance, the rationale behind these statutes
was to provide depositors and other bank creditors with the possibility of
recovering losses against bank shareholders that exceeded the value of what they
had invested in the bank. In the 1930s, federal banking legislation established the
first US governmental deposit insurance scheme and rescinded and pre-empted
previous federal and state banking laws respectively that had imposed limitations
on the principle of limited liability for shareholders.
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107 Art L613-25 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
108 See Sea Land Services, Inc v Pepper Source 941 F 2d 519, after remand, 993 F2d 1309 (7th Cir 1993)
(discussing veil piercing principles under US law). In contrast, the Salomon principle in English law
has been faithfully adhered to. See Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd (1897) (HL) AC 22. English courts
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109 Piercing the corporate veil will involve the application of equitable principles and ordinarily
depend on the facts of each case. US courts have been more lenient than English courts in
allowing veil piercing and usually require the presence of two factors: a grossly undercapitalised
company that disregarded corporate formalities, and which caused basic unfairness to the
plaintiff. See Pinto and Branson, supra n 33, 40.
In the 1970s, public regulatory law began to extend its regulatory
requirements beyond the corporate and business entities over which they directly
applied to include any investors who were defined under the federal regulatory
regime as owning a controlling interest, or exercising control in some other way,
in a regulated firm or institution.110 This has had the effect of limiting the
application of the principle of limited liability by exposing certain investors in
regulated companies to potential liability that exceeds the value of their
investments for regulatory breach against both the government and private
claimants. For instance, in US banking and thrift regulation, US regulators have
imposed prudential regulatory requirements on parent companies, affiliates or
individuals who own or control at least 5% of the shares of a regulated financial
institution.111 Specifically, the US Supreme Court held in Board of Governors v First
Lincolnwood112 that the Board of Governors had the authority to assess the
financial and managerial soundness of a company which had applied to
purchase a controlling interest in a bank corporation.113 The court upheld the
Board’s denial of the application on the grounds that the prospective investor
was, in the Board’s view, financially unsound and “would not be a sufficient
source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary bank”.114 In
addition, another aspect of the source of strength doctrine occurs when US
regulators determine that a bank is failing, or has failed, in which case they have
authority to compel existing controlling shareholders to downstream additional
capital into the ailing bank.115 In other words, the Board of Governors has
authority to issue directives requiring shareholders to invest substantial amounts
in addition to what they have already invested in a banking institution if the
regulator determines that the investors should provide further financial support.
The limitations on the principle of limited liability that occur under US
regulatory law in the form of the source of strength doctrine and other regu-
lations do not have an equivalent in European regulatory practice. Institutional
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investors in EU companies and banks are largely protected from regulatory
liability or other private civil claims for regulatory breach against the company to
the extent of the value of their investment in the company. As special resolution
regimes are amended in light of the present financial crisis, it is submitted that
regulators outside the US may seek broader powers, similar to the source of
strength doctrine, in order to require existing shareholders in banks to
demonstrate their capacity beyond what they have invested in the bank to be a
source of strength. In exceptional circumstances, policymakers may find it
necessary in order to protect depositors and maintain financial stability to pierce
the corporate veil of an ailing bank so as to compel some of its shareholders to
downstream capital to the bank.
5. Special Resolution Regimes and the UK Approach
A special resolution regime for banks should respect the principles of legality, due
process, limited liability and adequate compensation. At the same time, the
regulatory regime should provide incentives for shareholders, directors and
management to act in a way that protects depositors and maintains confidence in
the banking sector, while achieving a market-based solution to find investors for a
failing bank or disposing of the bank’s viable assets if the bank cannot be
saved.116
Commentators have generally agreed that three types of packages are
appropriate in the situation of a failing bank.117 The first is known as a
pre-packaged resolution which makes use of the company’s governance rules,
while the second approach allows the bank to exist temporarily while also
temporarily suspending shareholder rights. The third approach would terminate
the rights of shareholders altogether. The three approaches all rely on a capital
restructuring to save a failing bank and could be combined or substituted if
efforts to save a failing bank become impracticable and depositor protection and
an orderly winding without market disruption become the primary objectives.
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Regulation Y, or both.” See Policy Statement, 52 Fed Reg 15707, 15708 (1987).
117 See E Hupkes, “Bank Insolvency: the last frontier” in D Mayes, R Pringle and M Taylor (eds),
Towards a New Framework for Financial Stability (London, Central Banking Publications Ltd, 2009),
185, 194–95.
6. The UK Banking Act 2009 and Shareholder Rights
The Banking Act 2009 introduces a special resolution regime that provides the
FSA, the Bank of England and HM Treasury—also known as the tripartite
authorities118—with new powers to deal with failing banks. Specifically, the Act
grants the Treasury and the Bank of England sweeping powers to restructure a
failing bank by transferring shares and property to a government-owned bridge
bank or private purchaser.119 The Act also provides a mechanism to compensate
shareholders, depositors and third party creditors.120
The stabilisation powers consists of three areas: (i) pre-insolvency stabilisation
powers; (ii) a bank insolvency procedure; and (iii) a bank administration
procedure.121 The Bank of England has the sole responsibility for exercising the
stabilisation powers that include: transfers of shares and any other property
(including partial property transfers) owned by the failing bank to either a private
sector purchaser or a bridge bank, or into temporary public ownership. In
exercising these powers, the Bank would have authority to appoint a temporary
administrator to manage the affairs of a bank taken into public ownership, or to
administer the residual assets of a bank from which shares and property were
transferred to a government-owned bridge bank or to a private purchaser.
The FSA would have the responsibility for determining whether the
pre-conditions for use of the stabilisation powers and the bank insolvency
procedures have been met.122 Section 7 sets out the two main conditions that
trigger the special resolution regime (SRR): (I) the bank is failing or is likely to
fail, and has failed to satisfy the threshold conditions for permission to carry on
regulated activities set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;123
and (ii) it is not reasonably likely that without the stabilisation powers the bank
can take action to satisfy the threshold conditions.124 The FSA would have to
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offered on ordinary terms.
determine that the threshold conditions125 have been met before the SRR can
become operational, with the result that the Bank of England can then exercise
the stabilisation powers. The Treasury is responsible for any decision involving
the use of public funds which might be required as a result of the Bank’s exercise
of special resolution tools. The Treasury can also use public funds to compensate
shareholders or third party creditors who can demonstrate that they have
suffered losses by having their shares or property—transferred either fully or
partially—to a bridge bank or to a private purchaser.126
The SRR provides for certain departures from general corporate governance
arrangements. The bank administration procedure allows for special adminis-
tration or conservatorship under which all corporate bodies—the board and
management—are suspended and an appointed official temporarily takes
control of the bank’s operations. The powers of the temporary administrator
also extend, however, to the shareholders’ power to determine changes to the
bank’s capital structure by suspending all such shareholder rights during
administration. As discussed earlier, EU company law requires that measures
affecting a bank’s capital structure, such as a capital increase or a merger with
another bank, are to be decided by shareholders. The ECJ ruled in Pafitis127 that
the Second Company Law Directive precludes national legislation which allows
an administrator to order a recapitalisation of an under-capitalised bank without
shareholder resolution and approval at a meeting. Similarly, the ECJ ruled in the
Kefalas case128 that “the decision-making power of the general meeting provided
for in Article 25(1) applies even where the company is experiencing serious
financial difficulties”. A reorganisation involving a change in capital structure
therefore requires a vote of approval by shareholders at a general or special
meeting.
The powers provided to the Bank of England and to HM Treasury under the
special resolution regime to set aside these shareholder rights suggest that bank
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shareholders would have a strong legal basis to bring a claim under Article 25 of
the Second Directive.
Another approach could be made on the policy front by considering whether
the Second Directive should be amended to allow a quick recapitalisation by a
temporary administrator from other investors when an individual bank is faced
with a sudden loss of confidence or when there is a declared financial crisis. This
would allow the special administrator in the SRR to have greater powers in the
event of the deterioration in the condition of a bank. The effect of this may not
be so deleterious for shareholders, as they often have accepted a dilution of
control and share value in connection with capital raisings in the present crisis.129
Yet it may be more legitimate, based on the legal principles discussed above, to
allow a public regulatory authority to impose a capital raising without
shareholder approval if the decision is based on clear criteria and agreed
regulatory standards. A regulator or other state authority could ensure that
shareholders are afforded due process and the decision is based on coherent and
legitimate requirements. If shareholders suffer losses, they should be compen-
sated, as is required under the UK Banking Act, based on principles of equal
treatment. Under this approach, the shareholders’ control and economic rights
may be significantly reduced, but they would retain a diluted interest in their
bank along with an upside gain if the bank recovers and leaves administration.
The alternative would be shareholders insisting on full adherence to their right
of approval to any capital change, but with the risk that without the protections
of the special resolution regime the shareholders will lose all their interests in a
collapsed bank.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The financial market turbulence of 2007–09 has raised important concerns
regarding the intensity of bank regulation and the extent to which regulatory
measures should infringe property rights in banking institutions. European law
provides strong property protection rights for bank shareholders, while US law
provides more limited protections. Although it is recognised that regulators
should be able to act quickly in a crisis, shareholders have legitimate rights which
should be protected. The exercise of prudential regulatory authority without
consideration of the principles of legality, due process, compensation, and
limited liability may infringe shareholder rights in banking corporations. These
rights, however, must be weighed against the interests of other stakeholders and
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wider regulatory objectives to protect financial stability. Balancing these interests
creates challenges for designing a bank resolution framework. The challenges are
particularly great when dealing with failing banks which perform functions
essential for the economy. The UK Banking Act 2009 sets forth a new regime to
reorganise failing banks and to take failed banks into administration or
liquidation. The Act adopts a special resolution regime that contains stabilisation
powers for the Bank of England to transfer property and shares from a failing
bank to a bridge bank or private bank. Although these powers might infringe
shareholder rights in a failing bank, the exercise of these powers has the objective
of striking a balance between the legitimate rights of shareholders and depositors
while promoting financial stability objectives. The UK regime provides a model
for how other states can manage the uncertainties of the present financial
climate, but nevertheless reform of EU Company Law may be necessary to bring
this to fruition.
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